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An important problem in Supply Chain Management is to decide which set of
capabilities to develop among partners and which to develop in-house.  This decision
impacts the strategic issue concerning the location of key resources within the supply
chain network. The supply chain literature suggests that for a chain to successfully
compete against other chains, such resource development decisions be made so as to
optimize across the chain rather than from the point of view of any individual player
(Christopher, 1998). Developing and managing supply chains in emerging markets is
becoming increasingly important as firms position themselves to take advantage of
global outsourcing to low income countries.  Emerging markets are dominated by low
scale economy industries, such as textiles, leather and light engineering.  However,
supply chains in many low scale economy industries in emerging markets remain
suboptimal due to activities being performed within larger firms, even though better
alternatives are available through outsourcing.  High levels of vertical integration are
often common in the early stages of industrial development.  As markets develop,
government policies change, technology diffuses, and new competitors emerge, large
firms are forced to evaluate outsourcing options.
Reduction of transaction costs has been identified as an important objective of
supply chain management, and the analysis of transaction costs provides a useful
theoretical basis for the study of supply chain management (Hobbs, 1996, Ettlie and
Sethuraman, 2002). Based on a case-study of outsourcing practices and de-integration
in Pakistan’s footwear industry, and concepts from transaction cost economics, a
framework is developed for determining which set of products and activities to outsource
and which to keep in-house. The framework is of relevance not only to large firms
developing supply chains, but also to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as they
consider expansion decisions. Given the significant impact of government policy on
vertical integration/de-integration decisions, the findings are also relevant to policy
makers concerned with development of SME networks.
The next section lists the factors leading to vertical integration, followed by a
discussion on drivers of de-integration. Based on these discussions, section 3 lists the
key determinants of which products and activities are best outsourced and which are
best kept in-house. Section 4 presents a case study of vertical integration and recent
de-integration in Pakistan’s footwear industry with examples of considerations affecting
outsourcing decisions.  Based on this case study, and analysis of the theoretical literature
on vertical integration and supply chain management, a ‘framework’ for making
outsourcing decisions is presented in the next section.  The last section has some ideas
for future research.
2. Drivers of Vertical Integration
Multiple factors contribute to the establishment and continued existence of large
integrated firms despite inherent inefficiencies. These can be described in terms of
reduced costs, weak supply networks, increased market power, and government policy.
1
The Economics of Outsourcing in a De-integrating Industry
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important during early stages of economic development.
2.1 Cost Reductions
Integrated firms have a cost advantage over smaller firms by avoiding transaction
costs in  imperfect markets, particularly during early stages of market development.
According to Hennart (1993), transaction costs include ‘the cost of measuring output
in all of its dimensions and the consequence of not measuring it perfectly’. These
include the costs of writing, monitoring and enforcing contracts with supply chain and
other partners. Supply networks in early stages of development are characterized by
imperfect markets resulting in high transaction costs. Such costs are further amplified
under conditions of specialized assets, complexity, uncertainty, and information
asymmetry. These costs apply not only to transactions with suppliers but also with
customers. It is for this reason that larger firms are more able to become suppliers to
global firms.
Integrated firms avoid the high transaction costs often associated with activities
requiring highly specialized assets. In such cases the costs arise are related to writing,
monitoring, and enforcing contracts where specialized assets makes each party vulnerable
to the other (Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998).Outsourcing activities that require specialized
assets can result in opportunistic behavior, thereby increasing the risk to the partners.
For instance, an activity may require highly specialized equipment that cannot be used
for any other purpose or for another customer. A supplier would be reluctant to invest
in the equipment since if the buyer decides not to continue the outsourcing arrangement;
the supplier would be left with an asset that has no alternate use. Such specialized assets
can take various forms including physical assets such as equipment, human assets
involving specialized training for the activity, and location in order to lower transportation
and inventory costs. The need for specialized assets particularly arises when the industry
is young or where new technology is being introduced. Firms pioneering a new market
or technology may be unable to find suppliers willing to take the risk of investing in
the specialized assets required to undertake the activity, or may simply prefer to
appropriate the benefits of the innovation by keeping the new technology in-house.
Integrated firms also avoid the high costs of writing contracts in situations with high
uncertainty and high information exchange requirement (Winger, 1994), and the costs
of enforcing contracts where the legal environment for contract enforcement is weak.
In a study of 600 durable goods manufacturing companies in 20 countries, Ettlie and
Sethuraman (2002) found that shorter frozen schedules (implying higher levels of
uncertainty) were significantly correlated with low levels of (global) outsourcing.
Vertically integrated firms also benefit from reduced costs through economies of
scale, improved capacity utilization, decreased labor costs due to learning curve, lower
raw material procurement costs, etc.  (Porter, 1985).  The highly integrated Ford Motor
Company utilized scale economies of mass production to provide better value at a
lower price and thereby achieved market dominance (Langlois and Robertson, 1989).
These cost reductions are particularly significant in continuous process and assembly
lines industries resulting in high scale economies.  The vast integrated East India
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2Company in the 1700s, with its own fleet of ships, army, and diplomatic corp was
able to obtain spices and other goods at better prices (Chaudhuri, 1981), while the large
integrated American textile firms in the 1800’s, were better able to obtain steady
supplies of consistent quality yarn compared to smaller scattered firms (Tucker, 1984).
2.2 Offensive Market Power
Large integrated firms are better positioned to develop markets for new products
due to increased access to resources (financial, human, technology) and bargaining
power (Harrigan, 1985).  Such firms are able to build on their market knowledge to
identify niches, develop premium products and technology, invest in marketing efforts,
and establish distribution networks.  Furthermore such firms commit the necessary
resources to ensure consistent quality thereby building brand equity.
The highly integrated Bird’s Eye pioneered the frozen food industry by developing
a raw material supply network, introducing new harvesting and freezing technologies,
building product awareness, and establishing specialized warehousing, transportation
and retail equipment for handling frozen foods (Collis, 1992).  Rabellotti (1993) found
that larger integrated firms in Mexico’s footwear industry were more innovative in
terms of process and production technology, while smaller firms were limited by
unstable supplies, had little knowledge of the export market and generally earned lower
profits.
2.3 Government Policy
Large integrated firms are better positioned to influence and benefit from government
policy.  In early stages of industrial development capital, labor, and product markets
as well as the regulatory environment are poorly developed, and hence governments
in emerging markets have greater control over the allocation of resources.  For instance,
in the 1970s about 85 percent of Chile’s financial assets were state owned, labor markets
were controlled by government-affiliated unions, and government set price levels
(Khanna and Palepu, 1999).   Larger firms in such emerging markets benefit from
government policy and inefficient capital markets, and gradually become more vertically
integrated and horizontally diversified (conglomerates).  Indeed Williamson (1975)
identifies vertical integration as evidence of intermediate (such as supply networks)
markets failure and conglomerates as evidence of capital market failure.
In the 1960’s the Korean government as part of its Economic Development Plan gave
preferential treatment to major business groups through subsidized loans despite high
inflation (Chang and Choi, 1988).  Small manufacturers usually face high capital costs,
or inadequate capital. Little et al. (1987) point out that the high cost of capital to small
firms can be traced to high cost of administering these loans.
Up until late 1980’s, India government policy heavily regulated the establishment
of new industries, restricted access to foreign exchange, and imposed high import
tariffs.  As a result conglomerates flourished.  For instance, the Tata empire with
230,000 employees in 95 companies, dominates industries ranging from steel and trucks
to software and power generation (Ellis, 2002).
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3In conclusion, large vertically integrated firms are likely to emerge in high scale
economy industries, in situations where markets are imperfect, where government
intervention is high, and where premium products are being pioneered.
3. Drivers of De-Integration
The previous section describes reasons for the existence of large integrated firms.
However as markets develop, as knowledge diffuses, and as government influence on
markets decrease, large firms in low scale economy industries face pressures to de-
integrate. In such industries, smaller suppliers are often more flexible, specialized and
avoid the inefficiencies generally prevalent in the larger integrated firms due to shirking
and labor costs. Hence it is expected that to the extent possible, activities should be
outsourced rather than conducted in-house.
There is considerable evidence, both theoretical and empirical, to support the
assertion that outsourcing results in lower production costs and overheads. The classic
paper by Stigler (1951), built on Adam Smith’s theorem that the division of labor is
limited by the extent of the market, argued that as markets develop, specialization
increases and drives vertical de-integration. Specialization also results in economies
of doing a limited set of activities. Strategically, the specialized supplier focusing on
a few core technologies and markets would build a richer base of relevant knowledge.
A study of nineteenth century American and English textile industry found that
specialized firms were able to produce higher value products (Temin, 1988). Lall (1980)
found that major Indian truck manufacturers outsourced components involving
technologically dissimilar areas (such as electrical, glass, rubber). Furthermore these
truck manufacturers outsourced “specialized products (like pistons, fasteners, fuel
injection) to large independent producers who serve the whole industry to reap economies
of scale”. Finally specialized firms, because of their smaller size have greater hiring
and firing flexibility and are able to respond faster to changing markets and technologies
(Harrigan, 1985).
Mahoney (1992) identifies three major reasons for why firms do not integrate:
increases in production, bureaucratic, and strategic costs. Specialized suppliers with
a larger customer base would be able to achieve full economies of scale in their
production technology, and also be less constrained by capacity imbalance, compared
to the integrated firm. Integration increases the size of the firm, which results in such
additional hierarchical levels, bureaucracy, and even deliberate distortions to achieve
divisional objectives. The availability of captive internal markets reduces direct
competitive pressures on intermediate products, thus increasing slack.  Hennart (1993)
refers to these as shirking costs, which he describes as: 'the cost of managing is the
cost of directing and observing behavior and of failing to do it perfectly'.
The supply chain literature contains numerous examples of advantages gained through
outsourcing. Toyota subcontracts about 70 percent of its manufacturing, using over 30
thousand suppliers. General Motors, on the other extreme, sources 70 percent of its
parts in-house. Consequently, Toyota is able to assemble a car in half the time, and
with minimal inventory (2 days versus 2 weeks), while development time is also half
that of U.S. competitors (Womack, et al. 1990). It is thus not surprising that
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4when Chrysler began its turnaround in the late eighties, it started by overhauling its
supplier network, from 2500 to a lean long-term nucleus of 300. The benefits of
outsourcing are not confined to the auto industry. Based on a survey of 3185 manufacturing
lines of business in over 200 industries, D’Aveni, Richard and Ravenscraft (1994)
found that integrated firms had significantly higher production costs, than specialized
firms. Little et al. (1987), while surveying textile manufacturing units in various parts
of the world point out that wages in larger units are probably twice those in small
establishments even after controlling for skill differences.
4. What Not to Outsource
The previous section identifies industry conditions where de-integration represents
the most efficient structure for organizing the supply chain. As a general rule firms
facing such conditions should outsource their activities and develop supply partners.
However, it is suggested that firm-level activities involving proprietary knowledge and
high transaction costs (the latter due to high levels of product demand uncertainty and
requirements for specialized assets) are best retained in-house.
4.1 Activities involving proprietary knowledge
Considerable literature exists suggesting that certain activities are to be recognized
and treated as “core competencies” of the firm.  Such core activities need to be developed
as part of a strategic plan and resources committed accordingly.  An important
characteristic of core activities is propriety knowledge.  This includes knowledge related
to production and marketing, and resides mostly within the firm. In terms of the Resource
Based theory, firms are characterized by resource heterogeneity which leads to
competitive advantage and consequent rents (Moran and Ghoshal, 1999), (Madhok and
Tallman, 1998). Economic value is created through resource deployments, particularly
through new resource combinations resulting in the development of new products and
services. The knowledge component of core activities often provides high rents and
hence has attracted considerable research attention (Schoonhoven, 2002).  Hence core
activities involving propriety knowledge generally should not be outsourced. For
instance, Cummins Engine Company retains the production of strategic component
families in-house, except where the company does not have the resources or time for
the required investment (Venkatesan, 1992).
4.2 Activities involving high transaction costs
As discussed in the earlier section on drivers of vertical integration, outsourcing
activities requiring specialized assets and high levels of uncertainty may result in
opportunistic behavior and thus higher transaction costs related to contract writing and
monitoring. These specialized assets may take the form of specialized equipment,
location, or human resources required for new product development and meeting
stringent quality and delivery requirements.
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51Henceforth Bata (Pakistan) will be referred to as Bata.
2Henceforth Service Industries will be referred to by its brand name ‘Servis’.
5. Footwear Case-study
Pakistan, with a population of 140 million (growing at 2.9 percent per annum), has
a footwear market of above 150 million pairs/year.  There are three distinct classes of
suppliers to this market, i.e., the informal sector, the small manufacturers, and large
integrated units. The informal sector consists of over 17,000 units, each with an average
of two employees. Firms in this sector generally pay no taxes, and predominantly sell
non-branded shoes through cobbler-shops. In addition, there are about 500 small
manufacturers who distribute through wholesalers or their own outlets.  Finally there
are two large integrated manufacturers, with almost 20 percent share of the market,
and sell through their own national distribution network. Both of these firms have
recently started outsourcing selected product lines and are actively developing supply
networks.
In this section we explore the forces that led to the establishment of these two large
integrated players, the forces which now are leading to de-integration, and detailed
examination of specific instances of outsourcing choices. In the process we test the
applicability of the theoretical literature presented in the previous sections.
5.1 Early vertical integration
Bata (Pakistan) was established in Batapur (near Lahore) in 1942 as a branch of
Bata of British India in Batanagar (near Calcutta), as part of Bata International
headquartered in Toronto, Canada.  Bata (Pakistan) became an independent firm after
the partition of British India in 1947.  Service Industries was established in Gujrat in
1954.  Though Bata1 is almost twice the size than Servis2 is (10% versus 6% share of
market), both followed almost identical strategies.  Both were vertically integrated
firms, with company owned leather tanneries, shoe manufacturing, and retail network.
 Both had built strong brands by providing reliable quality shoes at affordable prices,
and through extensive advertising particularly during Eid festivals and school openings.
Smaller non-integrated manufacturers with limited access to quality raw material,
reliable distribution networks, low cost capital and imported technology, were unable
to compete against Servis and Bata.
Access to consistent and high quality leather is essential to producing reliable shoes.
Quality leather tanning involves a complex production process, imported chemicals,
and expensive equipment.  In 1947, with only five tanneries in Pakistan, an efficient
market for quality leather did not exist and thus not allowing smaller manufacturers
access to the raw material necessary for producing quality shoes.
In the initial years Servis followed Bata’s distribution strategy by simply opening a
store right next to a Bata store. In 2002, Servis and Bata had 260 and 350 retail outlets
(mostly in rented properties), respectively.  Both had plans to expand the number of
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market for property which allowed low rents to continue for decades despite double
digit inflation.  Small manufacturers without access to such retail networks were
dependent on distribution systems controlled by wholesalers who often defaulted or
delayed payments.  Smaller players also lacked access to low cost capital and imported
technology available to the larger players in the 1960’s.  At that time, the government
through an extensive industrialization plan provided selected access to capital and
licenses which were required for importing equipment.  The smaller players neither
had the political clout of the Servis Group nor the multinational influence wielded by
Bata to benefit from government policy.
5.2 Gradual De-integration
During the 1980s the leather and footwear industries expanded, several new players
entered the value chain, and the market for intermediate products became more efficient.
Smaller non-integrated manufacturers gained increased access to quality raw material,
to low cost capital, to imported technology, and to distribution networks. These smaller
players generally had lower operating costs and at times developed specialized expertise.
In the late nineties Bata and Servis were facing increased competition from these smaller
firms as well as imported footwear, and were actively developing supply networks to
remain competitive.
During the eighties, remittances from migrant workers in the Middle-East together
with the Afghan war resulted in 6 percent annual GNP growth and increased consumer
spending. The increased market size was accompanied by a three-fold increase in
retailers and catalyzed a three-fold growth in the number of footwear manufacturers
during 1982-88 (Government of Pakistan, 1988).
In addition to increased market access, smaller footwear manufacturers gained
access to improved sources of raw material, technology and capital. During the period
1981 to 1992 the number of tanneries tripled (from 180 to 509), making quality finished
leather widely available to footwear manufacturers. The increase in tanneries was a
direct consequence of increased leather exports, caused by widespread closure of
tanneries in Europe resulting from ecological concerns. Changes in the global leather
industry provided local tanners access to inexpensive used equipment and technology
from their international customers. Furthermore both tanners and footwear manufacturers
gained from government de-regulation which decreased tariffs on imported equipment
and raw material, and gave increased access to capital.
As a result of the changed economics of vertical integration during the eighties,
both Bata and Servis started a process of de-integration in the late 1990s. Bata diversified
out of leather tanning in 1996, and embarked on a program to increase outsourcing.
The overall plan is to increase outsourcing to specialized vendors and not to vendors
who manufacture multiple lines (caused due to vendors diversifying in response to
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3Along with expanding its distribution, Bata was also planning to start a new chain of stores (with a new
brand name) in a lower price segment to compete with the informal sector.erratic demand/uncertainty). During this period, while Bata sales was roughly the same,
its labour force decreased by 20 percent.  In 1965, the marketing and distribution
division of Servis was formed into a separate company: Service Sales Corporation
(SSC).  In 1998, SSC became an autonomous body and by 2002, SSC had increased
the value of products being procured from outside the Servis group to 30 percent.
5.3 Outsourcing at Servis & Bata
In 2002, both Servis and Bata carried about 1500 Stock Keeping Units (SKUs)
each, grouped broadly into six product categories. Each of these six categories is
characterized by different production technologies, and market characteristics (see
Table 1). The production technologies vary from processes like ‘lasted stuck-on sole’
which involve labour intensive stitching, to complex, capital intensive process like
‘Direct Injection’ for producing Joggers. Market characteristics for each product category
also vary in terms of demand stability, quality and price sensitivity. As shown in Table
1 and discussed below, the outsourcing decision for each product category by Servis
and Bata, also varies depending on scale economies, transactional costs (due to specialized
assets and demand uncertainty), and proprietary knowledge.
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aBut some production outsourced during peak season
ItemsWomen Sandals & Slippers involve low scale economy technologies.  These shoes
are produced with ‘stuck-on sole technology’, using labor intensive stitching processes
(10 pairs/worker/shift) and inexpensive technology (Rs 0.3 million).  Despite the high
demand uncertainty associated with fashion items, transaction costs of outsourcing are
low, making contracts easy to write and enforce. The low transaction costs are due to
low requirements for specialized assets since the technology and skills are widely
diffused.  Furthermore, any proprietary knowledge regarding new product development
is more available with smaller specialized players.  The combination of low scale
economies, low transaction costs, and minimal proprietary knowledge has resulted in
Women Sandals & Slippers being one of the first choices for outsourcing by both Servis
and Bata. Men Moccasins have production characteristics similar to Women Sandals
& Slippers. However the larger lot size (because of greater volume for a given SKU)
allows for assembly line manufacturing, resulting in higher scale economies.  Also, the
longer product life cycle of Men Moccasins result in more stringent quality requirements.
The generally lower production quality of the small players makes enforcing
standards more difficult.  The scale economies and quality requirements has resulted
in much of the production for this category being done inhouse.  The recent growth of
the industry and diffusion of quality stitching equipment has made it easier to monitor
and enforce contracts for quality products, thus making outsourcing of Men Moccasins
a viable option for both Bata and Service.
Production of PVC Slippers requires a more capital intensive process (‘injected
plastic technology’ equipment worth Rs 3 million) compared to the two product
categories discussed above, and faces a stable, price-sensitive market.  In recent years
a few new firms have developed the specialized expertise in the handling of equipment
and chemicals required for PVC production.  These firms due to their scale economies,
specialized assets (human and equipment) and proprietary knowledge have become the
leading suppliers in this product category to not only Servis but also the wholesale
market. However, Bata has not moved out of PVC production yet, and is still producing
slippers that are priced significantly higher than those available elsewhere.
Production of thongs is similar to PVC slippers in terms of relatively high scale
economies and level of expertise required.  Market is price sensitive and the quality
requirement is even lower than PVC.  In such a case, with low levels of proprietary
knowledge, and low levels of demand uncertainty, transaction costs are expected to be
low, and as a result thongs would be more efficiently produced through outsourcing
to smaller specialized manufacturers. Interestingly enough both Servis and Bata continue
to produce thongs in-house, although for a short period Servis had outsourced thongs.
Though production and marketing characteristics of thongs are conducive to outsourcing,
specialized quality producers have not emerged, making outsourcing unviable for Servis
and Bata. The reason may be due to the lack of an efficient market for the raw material
for thongs (expanded foam sheets which are produced in-house by Servis and Bata)
compared to the more efficient raw material market for PVC.
Canvas Shoes are produced through a complex ‘vulcanization’ process which is
even more capital intensive (equipment cost Rs 5 million) than any of the technologies
described above, making both scale economies and transaction costs high. Furthermore
the technology is proprietary (has not diffused beyond Servis and Bata). As a result,
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Canvas Shoes, the production of Joggers also involves a complex, capital intensive
process, and involves proprietary knowledge which has not diffused widely. Thus, like
canvas shoes, and consistent with theory, both Servis and Bata produce Joggers in-
house.
6. Framework for making outsourcing decisions
An analysis of the theoretical literature on vertical integration and supply chain
management, together with evidence based on outsourcing decisions by major integrated
footwear manufacturers in Pakistan, suggests a framework for making such decisions
(see Figure 1 on page 11).  The framework suggests activities being considered for
outsourcing should be evaluated in terms of five key aspects: level of proprietary
knowledge, economies of scale, inefficiencies of vertical integration, and transactional
costs, and the existence of reliable vendors.
Thus, it is suggested that a firm considering activities for outsourcing should
undertake the following steps:
Proprietary Knowledge. Estimate the impact due to diffusion of proprietary knowledge
if activity is outsourced.
Cost Savings. Identify potential vendors, and compare in-house versus vendor costs
(difference due to in-house scale economies and inefficiencies of vertical integration).
Transaction Costs. If a significant difference exists between in-house and vendor costs,
estimate the potential transactional costs of outsourcing (in terms of costs of opportunistic
behavior where specialized assets are involved, costs of exchange of tacit knowledge,
and other overheads involved in contract writing, execution and enforcement).
Reliable Vendors.  If cost savings due to outsourcing justify the transaction costs,
together with any strategic considerations, assess vendor reliability and outsource. If
reliable (quality and delivery) vendors do not exist, invest in vendor development.
7. Further research
The framework developed in this paper, while based on strong theoretical foundations,
needs to be further validated in the context of other low-scale economy industries going
through the process of de-integration.  The global textile industry presents one such
example.  Decreasing tariffs and quotas, and the consequent growth in international
trade, is creating efficient markets in different parts of the supply chain and the emergence
of specialized intermediaries.
The theoretical framework itself needs to be further refined.  Particularly the notion
of proprietary knowledge needs to be tied in to the large set of literature that is developing
in the area of knowledge management across firm boundaries.
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13Abstract
Many large firms in low scale economy industries are actively considering
outsourcing options, in the face of competition from smaller more efficient players.
 Based on a review of the theoretical literature and a case-study of outsourcing
decisions at two large vertically integrated footwear manufacturers in Pakistan, a
framework is developed for determining which set of products and activities to
outsource and which to keep in-house.  The framework suggests activities being
considered for outsourcing be evaluated in terms of level of proprietary knowledge,
economies of scale, inefficiencies of vertical integration, transactional costs, and
the existence of reliable vendors. It is suggested that activities with low levels of
proprietary knowledge and activities where cost savings due to outsourcing justify
the increased transaction costs, should be outsourced.